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NOTES AND COMMENTS
to the latter rule in divorce and separation cases in order that no barrier
exist to a reunion of the parties.8
An attorney may intervene to recover compensation from a fund
in courto or to enforce a lien by summary proceedings in the client's
actions,' 0 but no cases have been found, nor were any cited by the
court, which present the exact issue of the principal case. As a
practical matter the issue is related to the tort of defamation because
words harming a plaintiff in his profession are actionable per se for
which the tort-feasor is liable in damages.1 Should the adoption
order be set aside for fraud there would clearly be irreparable damage
to intervener's valuable reputation for which the remedy at law is
inadequate since statements otherwise actionable are absolutely privil-
eged when made in pleadings filed in judicial proceedings. 12 Permission
to appear as an amicus curiae is also an inadequate remedy because
the attorney could neither except to nor appeal from adverse rulings.
Intervention will neither cause unreasonable delay nor uncertainty and
any multiplicity of suits is thereby prevented. The court should be
commended not only for reaching a satisfactory result in this case but
also for furthering the liberal interpretation of statutes generally.
POWER OF STATE COURT TO RESTRAIN SUIT IN ANOTHER
STATE
Pitcairn v. Drummond
Receivers of the Wabash Railway under appointment of the Federal
District Court of Missouri sued in Indiana to enjoin defendant from
maintaining an action against them in Illinois under the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act to recover for personal injuries occurring in the
operation of trains in Indiana. Held, injunction denied. Indiana courts
have no jurisdiction to control the setus of actions against federal
receivers.'
State courts have power to restrain citizens of the state, or other
persons within the control of their process, from prosecuting suits in
other states or in foreign countries when the prosecution of such suits
sNote (1925) 45 A.L.R. 941.
9Phillips v. Edsall, 127 Ill. 535, 20 N. E. 801 (1896); Kellogg v.
Winchell, 273 Fed. 745 (1921).
l9Weicher v. Cargill, 86 Minn. 271, 90 N. W. 402 (1902); Myers v.
Miller, 134 Neb. 824, 279 N. W. 778 (1938); Byram v. Miner,
47 F.(2d) 112 (C.C.A. 8, 1931).
1HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) Sec. 241.
"2HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933) See. 248.
1 Pitcairn v. Drummond, 23 N. E. (2d) 21 (Ind. 1939).
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is contrary to the equitable doctrine of vexatious litigation.2 The
granting of an injunction is said to be not an attempt to control the
actions of the court of another state, but is a restriction upon the
person within the jurisdiction of the court issuing the injunction.3
Mere inconvenience or expense to a party does not create vexatious
litigation unless the foreign action also deprives him of some sub-
stantial right or defense. 4
The principal case involves not only the Federal Employers Liabil-
ity Act,5 but also the right to sue a federal receiver. At common law,
receivers could not be sued without leave of the appointing court, and
then only upon conditions fixed by the court.6 This practice was
followed in the United States. Both federal and state courts appoint-
ing receivers have power to control actions against receivers appointed
by them.7 It has been held contempt of court to sue a receiver without
such permission.8
Congress has provided by statute 9 that a plaintiff may sue a
2Sandage v. Studebaker liro. Mfg. Co., 342 Ind. 148, 41 N.E. 280
(1895) (injunction restraining prosecution of foreign suit to av oid
substantive law of the domicile of the plaintiff); Kern v. The
Cleveland, Cin., Chi. and St. Louis Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E.
446 (1933) (injunction restraining prosecution of foreign suit
which would be burdensome and expensive to defendant and which
would interfere with interstate commerce); Cleveland, Cin., ChL
and St. Louis Ry. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170 N.E. S28 (1932)(injunction restraining prosecution of foreign suit as distance
would cause appellant needless and irreparable damage and give
appellee an inequitable and unfair advantage); Reeds Adm'x v.
Illinois Central Railroad, 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794 (1918)(injunction restraining suit in a foreign state on allegation that
it was brought for the purpose of harassing the defendant and
putting him to greater expense). Note (1930) 5 Ind. L. J. 525,
Note (1932) 7 Ind. L. J. 257.
8 Rader v. Stubblefield, 43 Wash. 560, 86 Pac. 560 (1906); Dehon v.
Foster, 4 Allen 545 (Mass. 1862).
4 Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928);
Chicago, Mil. and St. Paul Ry. v. Mc Ginley, 175 Wis. 565, 185
N.W. 218 (1921).
t45 U.S.C.A. §56.6 Anonymous, 6 Vesey 287, 31 Eng. Rep. 287 (1801); Angel v. Smith,
9 Vesey 335, 32 Eng. Rep. 632 (1804); Russell v. East Anglican
Railway, 3 Mac Naghten and Gordon 104, 42 Eng. Rep. 201 (1850).
7 De Groot v. Jay, 30 Barb. Ch. 483 (N.Y. 1859); Robinson v. The
Great Atl. and Great West. Ry., 66 Pa. 160 (1870) ; Olds v. Tucker,
35 Ohio St. 581 (1880); Davis v. Gray, 16 Wallace 203 (U.S.
1872); Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881).
8 Angel v. Smith, 9 Vesey 335, 32 Eng. Rep. 632 (1804); Davis v.
Gray, 16 Wallace (83 U.S.) 203 (1872); Thompson v. Scott, 4
Dill 508, Fed. Cases No. 13,197 (1876); De Visser v. Blackstone,
6 Blatchf. 235, Fed. Cases No. 3,840 (1868).
9 28 U.S.C.A. §125 "(Judicial Code, section 66) Suits against receiver.
Every receiver or manager of property appointed by any court
of the United States may be sued in respect of any act or trans-
action of his in carrying on the business connected with such
property, without the previous leave of the court in which such
receiver or manager was appointed; but such suit shall be subject
to the general equity jurisdiction of the court in which such
manager or receiver was appointed so far as the same may be
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federal receiver in any court of competent jurisdiction without obtain-
ing leave of the appointment court.' 0 This section does not limit the
bringing of the action in the court which appointed the receiver or in
a federal court; the receiver may be sued in a state court without the
permission of the court apopinting him. It is not within the power of
the federal court to deprive a party of that right.11 The suit must
fulfill the requirement that it arise out of an act or transaction of the
receiver in carrying on the business connected with the property.12 The
largest class of cases within this requirement are actions to recover
judgments for damages for injuries received through the negligent
operation of the property by the receiver."3 Cases involving possession
of the property in the hands of the receiver, or its administration or
management, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appointing
court.' 4 Any suit which is brought is subject to the general equity
jurisdiction of the appointing court. This clothes the federal courts
with ample power, by injunction, to prevent judgment creditors from
harassing a receiver or interfering with the property in his possession.'
The Indiana Courts have enjoined plaintiffs from bringing suits
under the Federal Employers Liability Act'6 in other state courts
10 Me Nulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S. Ct. 11, 35 L. ed 796
(1891); Texas and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 12 S. Ct.
905, 36 L. ed. 820 (1892).
" Me Nulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S. Ct. 11, 35 L. ed 796 (1891);
Texas and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 12 S. Ct. 905, 36 L.
ed 829 (1892); Texas and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 151 U.S. 81,
14 S. Ct. 250, 38 L. ed 81 (1894) ; Erb v. Morasch, 177 U.S. 584, 20
S. Ct. 819 (1900).
"2Dickinson v. Willis, 239 F. 171 (1916). The act does not authorize
the garnishment of funds in the receiver's hands alleged to belong
to a debtor in the receiver's employ, Central Trust Co. of New York
v. Wheeling and L.E.R. Co., 189 F. 82 (1911).
1 "Mc Nulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S. Ct. 11, 35 L. ed 796
(1891); The St. Nicholas, 49 F. 671 (1891); Texas and Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 12 S. Ct. 905, 36 L. ed 829 (1892);
Berwin-White Coal Mining Co. v. Eastern S.S. Corp., 228 F. 726(1916). An action for damages may be maintained in a state
court against a receiver for negligent operation of a railroad with-
out first obtaining leave from the United States Court appoint-
ing him, Malott v. Shimer, 153 Ind. 35, 54 N.E. 101 (1899).
14 Field v. Kansas City Refining Co., 9 F(2d) 213 (1925), cert
denied, 271 U.S. 676, 46 S. Ct. 489 (1926); Hayes v. Columbus,
L. and M. Ry. Co., 67 F. 630 (1895). "The line must be drawn
between those cases which seek to recover a judgment against
the receiver in the nature of damages and those cases which
involve the possession of the property in the hands of the receiver,
or the use of such property or the management thereof-the
administration of the property in his hands. As to questions of
possession, use and management, I an satisfied that the appoint-
ing court, whether it be state or federal, has exclusive jurisdic-
tion," Dickinson v. Willis, 239 F. 171 (1916).
i Meyer Rubber Co. v. Georgetown and W.R. Co., In re Jones, 177
F. 870 (1910), certiorari denied, 218 U. S. 679, 31 S. Ct. 227, 54
L. ed 1207 (1910).
16 45 U.S.C.A. §56.
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where the action would be burdensome and expensive to the defendant'-
or cause the defendant irreparable damage and give the plaintiff an
inequitable and unfair advantage.1s Other jurisdictions do likewise. 19
Federal receivers were not involved in these suits. In Mc Connell v.
Thompson2O the Indiana court refused to enjoin a plaintiff from bring-
ing an action in a federal court in another state because of the right
given the plaintiff under the Federal Employers Liability Act. It
held this was a right given by Congress with which the state court
could not interfere. The court distinguished its decision from that in
Kern v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co.21
which held that an Indiana court could enjoin the bringing of an ac-
tion under the Federal Employers Liability Act in a foreign state
court. The United States Supreme Court held in Douglas v. Ncw York
Railroad Co. 22 that the jurisdiction of the state courts is concurrent
with that of th- federal couils in regard to actions under the Federal
Emphl.: eis Liability Act. Therefore, it seems illogical, since the
jurisdiction of the federal and state courts is concurrent, that the
Indiana court - ould enjoin the maintenance of an action in a foreign
:tate court and refuse to do so if the action is pursued in a federal
court.
RIGHTS OF FIREMEN UNDER THE INDIANA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT
City of Fort Wayne v. Hazelett
The plaintiff filed a claim under the Workmens Compensation Act
for compensation for the death of her husband resulting from an
accidental injury suffered while in the performance of his duties as a
fireman of the City of Fort Wayne. The Industrial Board awarded
compensation, and the City appealed. Held, for appellant. A fireman
in the service of the municipality is not an employee within the scope
of the act.'
The Indiana Act provides that "'employer' shall include . .. any
municipal corporation within the state ... using the services of another
for pay," and "'employee' shall include every person in the service of
another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or
implied."' 2 The sole question presented by the principal case is whether
' Kern v. The Clev., Cin., Chi. and St. Louis Ry., 204 Ind. 595, 185
N.E. 446 (1933).
28 Cleveland, Cin., Chi. and St. Louis Ry. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273,
170 N.E. 328 (1932).
' Reeds Administratrix v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W.
794 (1918).
20213 Ind. 16, 8 N.E.(2d) 986, 11 N.E.(2d), 183 (1937),
21204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 446 (1933).
22 Douglas v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R.R., 279 U.S. 377,
49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. ed 747 (1929).
, City of Fort Wayne v. Hazlett, 23 N.E.(2d) 610 (Ind. App. 1939).
- Ind. Acts 1929, c. 172, § 73, p. 536; BURNS IND. STAT.ANN. (1933)
4 40-1701.
